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RATE COMPETITION BETWEEN RAILROADS AND OTHER
MODES OF TRANSPORT
Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York, New Haven and
Hartford Railroad Co.
372 U.S. 744 (1963)
Sea Land Service, Inc.,1 a water carrier operating principally between
ports on the Atlantic Coast and the Gulf of Mexico, proposed lowered rates
on 489 movements 2 after substantially reducing its operating expenses by
converting from break-bulk to containerized motor-water-motor 3 carriage:
the Interstate Commerce Commission, Division 2, permitted the bulk of
these rates to become effective.4 Southwestern and eastern railroads, despite
an admonition by Division 2,5 thereafter filed lowered rates on selected
trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) commodity movements from points in the east
to Dallas and Fort Worth; these rates were roughly on a parity with the
new Sea Land rates and were intended to provide increased rail competition
for the traffic moving by Sea Land.6 The ICC investigated the proposed
rail rates and found, first, that the rates would prove compensatory to the
proponents, in that they generally exceeded out-of-pocket costs and in
many cases exceeded fully-distributed cost,7 and, secondly, that the rates
were the vanguard of an army of contemplated reductions which would
threaten the continued existence of the coastwise water carriers." Although
the Commission discussed the relative costs of the competing modes it did
not determine where the inherent advantages of the carriers lay as to any
of the rates in issue.9 In applying the rule of ratemaking to its findings the
I Formerly Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation: the name was changed on
April 1, 1960. Commodities-Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 313 I.C.C. 23, 25
n. 3. (1960).
2 Commodities-Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 309 I.C.C. 587, 597 (1960).
3 Sea Land's containerized carriage amounted to transportation of loaded trailers
minus their motor cabs. For informational material on containerized carriage, see 73
Interstate Commerce Commission Ann. Rep. 64; (1959); 76 Interstate Commerce
Commission Ann. Rep. 110; (1962); Fox, "Trailer on Flatcar Rates," 28 I.C.C. Prac.
J. 833 (1961).
4 Commodities--Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 309 I.C.C. 587, 597 (1960).
5 Id. at 606.
6 Commodities-Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corporation, 313 I.C.C. 23, 34 (1960).
7 Id. at 44.
8 Id. at 47. The Commission noted that the rail rates might, if approved, "pre-
cipitate a cycle of destructive competition" Id. at 41. This would seem to indicate
that the threatened destruction, if possible, was at least not imminent, and that the
carriers by water had the will, if not the wherewithal, to continue to compete.
9 Id. at 46.
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Commission determined that the National Transportation Policy 10 (here-
after referred to as the NTP) embodied in section 15a(3) 11 outweighed
that section's mandate of increased competition and concluded that the
proposed rate reductions must be forbidden as violative of the NTP's
proscription of destructive competition and its encouragement of a trans-
portation system adequate to meet the needs of the national defense. In
concluding that destructive competition obtained in a situation in which
a carrier's traffic was competitively threatened, regardless of that carrier's
intrinsic fitness to carry that traffic, the Commission endorsed a rationale
which "reflects acceptance of 'umbrella' ratemaking under almost any
definition of that term." 12
On appeal the district court set aside the Commission's order and
enjoined the cancellation of TOFC rates which returned the fully dis-
tributed costs of carriage. 13 The Supreme Court vacated the district
court's judgment, set aside the Commission's order and remanded the pro-
ceedings to the Commission.14 In substantial agreement with the lower
10 The National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899, 49 USC preceding § 1,
provides:
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of the Congress
to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation
subject to the provisions of this Act, so administered as to recognize and
preserve the inherent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, eco-
nomical, and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in trans-
portation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and
maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly au-
thorized officials thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equitable working
conditions-all to the end of developing, coordinating, and preserving a na-
tional transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well as other
means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of
the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this
Act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the
above declaration of policy.
1" 72 Stat. 572; 49 USC § 15a(3):
In a proceeding involving competition between carriers of different modes of
transportation subject to this Act, the Commission, in determining whether a
rate is lower than a reasonable minimum rate, shall consider the facts and
circumstances attending the movement of the traffic by the carrier or carriers
to which the rate is applicable. Rates of a carrier shall not be held up to a
particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation,
giving due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation
policy declared in this Act.
12 Harbeson, "The Regulation of Interagency Rate Competition Under the Trans-
portation Act of 1958," 30 I.C.C. Prac. J. 287, 300 (1962).
13 New York, N. H. & H. R.R. v. United States, 199 F. Supp. 635, 646 (D.
Conn. 1961). This decision is discussed in Harbeson, op. cit. supra at 299, and in
110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1168 (1962).
14 Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 372 U.S.
744 (1963). The decision will hereinafter be referred to as New Haven.
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court, the Supreme Court held that "on the present record, the disallow-
ance of the rates in question was not adequately supported" 15 by relevant
findings, due to the absence of a finding concerning the inherent advantages
of the proponent and protestant carriers. "When the court's view of law
or policy differs from that of the agency, the agency's findings often fail
to answer the questions the court deems crucial, and the only proper dis-
position the court can make of the case is a remand to the agency so that
the needed answer can be supplied." 16 In the instant case the court's con-
struction of section 15a(3) differed radically from the agency's: the Com-
mission appeared to consider the desiderata of the NTP as paramount
within the rule of ratemaking and applicable to the findings at hand; the
Supreme Court viewed the NTP as subordinate in the context of the statute
and inapposite to the Commission's findings. In the Court's view only an
additional agency finding of some inherent advantage in the protestant
carrier threatened with destruction could have rationalized the Commis-
sion's suspension order and made it conformable to the rule of rate making;
destruction of a carrier with no irreplacable advantage was considered not
to be within the NTP's proscription.
Thus the narrow or unavoidable holding of New Haven is that the ICC
cannot in an intermodal rate controversy rely upon the NTP's proscription
of destructive competition in suspending a proposed compensatory reduction
absent a finding of an inherent advantage in the threatened carrier. How-
ever, the broader importance of the decision lies primarily in the Court's
illumination of the extent to which the NTP "qualifies and limits the
freedom of intermodal rate competition" 17 and secondarily, in the tentative
judicial approval extended to fully-distributed costs as the proper criterion
for establishing the crucial cost-of-service advantage in future intermodal
rate controversies. The disclosure of the extent to which the NTP modifies
competitive freedom was developed in the authoritative exegesis of
section 15a(3) ; the Court's distribution of emphasis is general, reasonable
and comformable to the underlying legislative intent, and it is to be hoped
that the emphasis prescribed will be controlling in future cases. The tenta-
tive judicial approval of fully-distributed costs emerged from the Court's
commentary on destructive competition, and although it has been adopted as
a currency of convenience in a few recent ICC rulings, the Court probably
will not use it as precedent.
Section 15a(3) in its present form is the result of legislative com-
promise 1 8 and was from its enactment the subject of conflicting interpre-
tations. Under the heretofore prevailing view, section 15a(3) merely codi-
fied the balance between competition and control which inhered in the ICC
15 Id. at 761.
16 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 436, § 16.01, (1958).
17 Fulda, Competition in the Regulated Industries-Transportation 369, § 11.11
(1961).
18 Fulda, op. cit. s 1pra at 360; § 11.8; 104 Cong. Rec. 10859 (1958) (remarks of
Senator Smathers); 104 Cong. Rec. 10857 (1958) (memorandum of Senator Ke-
fauver) ; Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, "Stewardship of the I.C.C.," 86th Cong. 1st Sess., 15 (1960).
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decisions preceding it;19 however, spokesmen for railroad interests read
the section as putting primary emphasis on managerially created com-
petition.20 Members of the ICC espoused conflicting views in off-the-
record analysis, 21 although Commissioner Freas before Congress said of
the Commission, "It understands also that as a result of this amendment,
the principal emphasis, but not the exclusive emphasis, in a competitive
ratemaking proceeding involving different modes will be on the conditions
surrounding the movement of traffic by the mode to which the rate
applies." 22 Nevertheless, the amendment as enacted apparently had no
practical effect on the Commission's decision making process. 23 The
amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court has.
The Court's interpretation of section 15a(3) settles at least the major
aspects of the dispute over the intent effectuated by the statute: for future
decisions emphasis is to be placed primarily on the "clear congressional de-
sign" 24 embodied in the first clause, secondarily on the "more particularized
mandates of the National Transportation Policy" 25 and only finally on the
"broad policy factors" 26 in the NTP. The legislative intent embodied in
the first clause is the intent to encourage intermodal competition, to permit
each mode to assert its inherent advantages of cost and service, and to
foreclose agency paternalism. This fostering of competition is modified
by the NTP only to keep hard intermodal competition from becoming
destructive. The Court determined that hard competition obtains when
one carrier takes traffic from another by asserting an inherent advantage;
destructive competition when one carrier takes traffic from another mode
by preventing that mode from effectively asserting its inherent advantages.
The Court defined destructive competition thus generally, leaving
that term to be filled with meaning by the agency's future quasi-judicial
19 Panel, "Revised Rule of Ratemaking," 26 I.C.C. Prac. J. 1146, 1158 (1959);
Morton, "Let's Examine a Chestnut-Another Look at the Rule of Ratemaking," 28
I.C.C. Prac. J. 345 (1960) ; Schenker, "The Rate-Making Powers of the I.C.C.," 65
Pub. Util. Fort. 649, 650 (1960).
20 Langdon, "A Railroad View of Section 15a(3), Interstate Commerce Act,"
26 I.C.C. Prac. J. 879 (1959).
21 Address by Commissioner Everett Hutchinson to Annual Convention of Texas
Independent Meat Packers Association, August 16, 1958, excerpted in 26 I.C.C. Prac.
J. 13 (1958); Address by Commissioner Charles A. Webb to Regular Common
Carrier Conference of ATA, October 20, 1959, excerpted in 27 I.C.C. Prac. J. 275
(1959) ; "Some Aspects of Transportation Regulation," Address by Chairman Howard
Freas to Public Utility Law Section of ABA, August 25-27, 1958, reproduced in
62 Pub. Util. Fort. 792 (1958).
22 "Stewardship of the I.C.C.," supra note 19, at 16.
23 Fulda, op. cit. supra note 18, at 369, § 11.11; Harbeson, op. cit. supra, note 12,
at 304.
24 Interstate Commerce Commission v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R., 372 U.S.
744, 762 (1963).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. The Court concluded that only in "extraordinary circumstances" should
the Commission permit broad policy factors such as national defense to shape a
decision in derogation of the statute's more specific commands.
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inclusion and exclusion. However, in the situations 2 7 selected to exemplify
destructive competition the Court went far toward implicitly underwriting
fully-distributed cost as the relevant cost criterion for assigning the crucial
cost of service advantage in future intermodal rate controversies. However,
the Court wisely qualified its approval in two important particulars 28 and
appended a general disclaimer,29 a deferential bow to the Commission's
expertise.8 0 The result was that the commentary on fully-distributed cost
was left unsettled enough that it may be appealed to in future decisions
where predatory rate cutting is patent, but may as easily be avoided in
cases where its application would produce a result felt to be unreasonable.
This result, alternative adoption and rejection of fully-distributed cost, is
observable in microcosm in recent Commission rulings hereafter mentioned.
Although the use of fully-distributed cost to determine the inherent
advantage of low cost of service is underwritten by transportation econo-
mists and has usually been relied upon by the Commission,31 there are
several cogent reasons for refusing to establish fully-distributed costs as
the relevant criterion in all intermodal rate reduction cases. First, although
the use of fully-distributed cost tends to maximize carrier revenue by
making each movement self-supporting while leaving traffic with the car-
rier economically most fit to carry it, it also tends to raise prices to shippers
in the competitive area 32 without necessarily lowering rates correspond-
ingly in non-competitive areas.33 Secondly, fully-distributed cost remains
an abstraction of which the ICC has correctly said, "There can be no doubt
that an apportionment of constant costs to arrive at the fully-distributed
cost of a particular movement represents an effort to allocate costs which
are essentially, and by definition, unallocable. The Commission's Cost
27 "And the precise example given to the Senate Committee, which led to the
language adopted, was a case in which the railroads, by establishing on a part of
their operations a compensatory rate below their fully distributed cost, forced a
smaller competing lower cost mode to go below its own fully distributed cost and
thus perhaps to go out of business." Id. at 758.
28 The two qualifications are, first, that advantages of cost may be overcome by
superiorities of service and, secondly, that advantages of cost may be so overwhelm-
ing that competitors' rate reductions may be de minimis. Id. at 762, n. 14.
29 Id. at 760.
30 The Commission is apparently working on the problem of rate-cost criterion
in its hearings on docket number 34013, Rules to Govern the Assembling and Pre-
senting of Cost Evidence. 27 Fed. Reg. 4102 (1962); Interim Report, 321 I.C.C.
238 (1963).
31 I.C.C. Investigation and Suspension Docket number 7656, Grain in Multiple-
car Shipments-River Crossings to the South. Report of the Commission on recon-
sideration (official release, July 15, 1963).
32 Cf. Oppenheim, The National Transportation Policy and Inter-Carrier Com-
petitive Rates 62 (1945).
33 Opponents of the use of out-of-pocket costs have often objected that such a
criterion throws the burden of defraying a carrier's constant costs upon so-called
captive traffic. (Compare cases and commentary in Locklin, Economics of Transpor-
tation 435, 1947). It is clear that merely using fully-distributed costs without more
does not necessarily free captive, non-competitive traffic from pre-existing rates.
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Finding Section has recognized this fact." 34 The most sensible argument
leveled against the use of fully-distributed cost is that, like any mechanistic
legalism, it simply does not produce the desired and desirable, the rea-
sonable, result in every case: the Commission's opinion on reconsideration
in Grain in Multiple Car Shipments-River Crossings to the South 3
emphasizes this point.
In Grain the ICC found that protestant barge and barge-rail routes
had low fully-distributed costs for movements of grain from origins at
Ohio and Mississippi River crossings to major grain consuming areas in
the South. However, faced with the fact that much of the available traffic
was being carried by unregulated competition and would continue to be if
rates of regulated modes were held at the level of the lowest fully-dis-
tributed cost the Commission permitted proponent rail carriers to reduce
rates to a level below protestants' fully-distributed cost so that the railroads
could attract shipments then moving by unregulated carriers. The Com-
mission determined that, as a matter of policy, out-of-pocket costs should
be the criterion used to determine the inherent cost advantage when a
substantial amount of available traffic was being lost to unregulated carriers.
However, after justifying a reduction which it considered sufficient to
permit the rail carriers to recapture traffic from their unregulated com-
petitors, the Commission significantly required the railroads to raise the
proposed rates somewhat so that the impact of the new rate structure on
regulated barge competition would be less deleterious.
The reasonableness of relaxing the fully-distributed cost criterion in
Grain seems obvious. The exempt truckers were apparently carrying grain
into the South on backhauls at rates which were probably below their out-
of-pocket costs,"6 creating precisely that cut-throat, unstable competitive
environment which regulation attempts to prevent. It is clear that in an
environment of regulated competition the exempt carriers' short-sighted
rate cutting would have constituted destructive competition, deleterious to
the initiating carriers, their competitors, their shippers and, ultimately, the
public. The Commission benefited shippers by permitting a stable trans-
portation unit to enter the competitive arena created by the exempt modes;
moreover, there is a patent equity in the decision that a mode which bears
the burdens of regulation and delivers to the public regulation's benefits
should not suffer the full adverse effects of competitive tactics which it is
prevented from using.37
34 Grain in Multiple-car Shipments-River Crossings to the South, supra note
31, at 23. In the same proceeding one cost witness introduced ten different methods
of distributing constant costs over specific movements "with the various methods
producing widely varying figures on fully-distributed cost." Id. at 30.
35 Supra note 31. Hereafter referred to as Grain.
36 The Commission recognized that the precise level of the exempt truckers"
rates was impossible to ascertain since those rates were unpublished and subject to
change without notice. Grain, supra note 31 at 36. Commissioner Freas observed that
the rates had been characterized as "gasoline money." Id. at 63.
37 A significant recent case which merits comparison with Grain in Multiple-car
Shipments is Grain from Idaho, Oregon and Washington to Ports in Oregon and
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In Automobile Lamps and Alcoholic Liquors from Pennsylvania to
Texas and Louisiana 38 the Commission rejected the use of fully-distributed
costs on more tenuous grounds. After citing New Haven for the propo-
sition that the Commission is authorized to make cost comparisons on the
basis of out-of-pocket costs, Division 2 wrote, ". . . the use of out-of-pocket
costs as the determinant is especially appropriate where, as here, no other
cost evidence has been presented by the parties." 39 However, most of the
Commission's recent rulings in which the parties have proceeded success-
fully beyond the considerable obstacle of the burden of proof4" have indi-
cated the Commission's willingness to accept full-distributed cost as the
usual criterion for determining where the inherent cost advantage lies and,
therefore, as an indication of where destructive competition obtains.
It is still somewhat early to predict the total impact of the New Haven
decision on the disposition of protested rate reductions by the Commission;
it has been said that the conflict between hard competition and destructive
competition is raised only when the survival of the protestant carrier is
threatened,41 and the question of survival of the protestant carrier for the
movements in question has been alluded to, but has not been believably
raised in any of the recent rulings. Because survival has not been at issue,
the result in recent cases has been that the available traffic was divided
between the competing modes and, unfortunately, this result has been sup-
ported by language which seemed to indicate that traffic should be shared
in accordance with administrative fiat.
Typical of the decisions in which the competitive ideas of New Haven
are mixed with the language of traffic sharing by regulation is Steel Bars
from Lemont, Illinois, to Iowa, Kansas, Mo., Minn., and Neb.42 In that
case the Commission relied upon New Haven, saying:
Washington, 319 I.C.C. 534 (1963). In the latter proceeding rail carriers established
rates below their fully-distributed costs on many grain movements within the Pacific
Northwest, forcing competitive regulated barge and barge-motor carriers to promul-
gate rates below their full-distributed costs in order to remain competitive. Protestant
barge-motor carriers proved that they had the advantage of low fully-distributed cost
and Division 2 cancelled the limited-transit rail rates. In its ruling the Commission
relied entirely upon New Haven and distinguished its earlier holding in Grain in
Multiple-car Shipments.
38 319 I.C.C. 335 (1963).
39 319 I.C.C. 335, 338 (1963).
40 In at least three recent cases lowered rates have been approved because
protestant carriers have failed to introduce sufficient cost data to substantiate their
claims of inherent cost advantage. Garden Hose and Electric Cable from New Jersey
or Rhode Island to Points in Texas, 319 I.C.C. 227 (1963); Intercoastal Any-
Quantity Class and Commodity Rates, 319 I.C.C. 357 (1963); Cement Within
Southern Territory and from Hagerstown, Md., to the South, 319 I.C.C. 465 (1963).
The problem of burden of proof before the Commission is illustrated by Cast Iron
Boilers from Boyertown, Pa., to Points in Texas, 319 I.C.C. 319 (1963) in which
Division 2 suspended respondent's proposed rates because respondent had not con-
vinced the Division what item of loss and damage expense was properly applicable
to the movements in question, but allowed a rate challenged by protestants to remain
in effect because protestants' evidence was also incomplete.
41 Fulda, op. cit. supra note 18, at 369, § 11.11.
42 319 I.C.C. 292 (1963).
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The record shows that the proposed rates are amply compensatory
in that they exceed out-of-pocket costs, and in most instances,
fully-distributed costs. To require the respondents to hold their
rates at a higher level to protect the traffic of the water carriers
would be contrary to the purpose and effect of section 15(a) (3)
of the Act.
43
However, the Commission further observed:
Under the present level of rates, the respondents are able to
attract only 10% of the total annual out-bound tonnage moving
from Lemont .... Approval of the reduced rail rates should enable
the respondents to obtain a greater share of the available traffic
and to increase their revenues. The proposed rates appear to be
no lower than necessary to accomplish those objectives.44
Despite the fact that language consistent with administratively directed
traffic sharing appears in the recent decisions, it is clear that the traffic
sharing is occurring because of the carriers' mutual fitness, not because
of umbrella ratemaking. The nascent trend in the decisions following New
Haven is toward more agency tolerance of managerially initiated rate
reductions with consequent decreased agency reliance on value of service
pricing and the spectre of prospective rate wars to create relatively artificial
rate floors. In several cases reopened by the Commission for review in
the light of the New Haven decision, proposed rail rates, which had pre-
viously been refused on the grounds that they had not been shown to be
just and reasonable or no lower than necessary to meet competition, have
been approved.45 And, in Aluminum Articles from Sandow, Texas, to
Pennsylvania and New York,46 the Commission went so far as to say
that ". . . the Supreme Court held that except in extraordinary circum-
stances not present here, section 15a(3) prohibits holding up rates of one
mode to a particular level to protect the traffic of another mode, at least
until such rates are reduced below fully-distributed cost, even though the
competing mode has the inherent advantage of lower Cost." 47 The plea
often made by protestant carriers that a proposed rate, although above
the proponent's fully-distributed cost, is unreasonable because it is lower
43 319 I.C.C. 292, 303 (1963).
44 Id. at 304.
45 Garden Hose and Electric Cable from New Jersey or Rhode Island to Points
in Texas, 319 I.C.C. 227 (1963), (failure of proof) ; Wrought Pipe to the Southwest,
319 I.C.C. 310 (1963) (e-xtension of New Haven to a proceeding under § 3(1) : but
sce concurring opinion therein); Plastics from Texas to the East, 319 I.C.C. 379
(1963); Electric Cable and Wire from Worcester, Mass. to Houston, Tex, 319
I.C.C. 390 (1963); Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire and New York to
Texas and Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 396 (1963).
46 319 I.C.C. 431 (1963).
47 319 I.C.C. 431, 439 (1963). It is at least doubtful that New Haven has given
managerial initiative such a sweeping immunity in the area of rates above fully-
distributed costs. The NTP's directive to the Commission to "foster sound economic
conditions in transportation and among the several carriers" gives the Commission an
interest in carrier policy which will interact with managerial discretion at least as
long as some movements, e.g., rail passenger traffic, must be carried on at a net loss.
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than the traffic will bear, that is, lower than the value of service, has been
rejected by the Commission when considered in the light of the New
Haven decision.48
The treatment accorded the New Haven decision in the recent ICC
rulings seems to foreshadow both the future treatment of that decision as
precedent in the Supreme Court and the probable importance of the decision
for future ICC regulation of intermodal rate reduction controversies. As
precedent, the decision's commentary on fully-distributed costs will prob-
ably be alternately invoked and ignored depending upon the reason of the
case at hand. New Haven will surely be invoked for its distribution of
emphasis among the conflicting mandates of the rule of ratemaking and
its general commentary on destructive competition. As a force for change
in the rulings of the ICC, New Haven seems to point the way toward a
period of intensive but orderly competition which will tend to produce, not
a rate structure which would permit all modes to participate, but "a rate
structure which would reflect the relative economy and fitness of the com-
peting modes of transportation," 49 and would deliver the benefit of that
relative economy to shippers and consumers. 50
48 Alcoholic Liquors from Maryland, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania
to Florida, 319 I.C.C. 323 (1963); Alcoholic Liquors from New Hampshire and
New York to Texas and Louisiana, 319 I.C.C. 396 (1963).
49 Harbeson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 305.
50 Readers who are interested in more extensive commentary on this topic
should consult Nathanson, "Administration Proposals for Revision of Our National
Transportation Policy-Herein of Intermodal Competition and the Minimum Rate
Power," 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 583 (1963). Part One of Professor Nathanson's excellent
article investigates the standards underlying the Commission's use of the minimum
rate power and includes a full discussion of New Haven.
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